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Abstract
Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-anonymous re-
viewing? I consider two arguments in favor. The first says that insofar
as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not have
had under triple-anonymous review, an injustice is committed against
certain authors. I show that even well-meaning editors would commit
this wrong and I endorse this argument.
The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are
affected by information they would not have had under triple-anony-
mous review, it will negatively affect the quality of published papers.
I distinguish between two kinds of biases that an editor might have. I
show that one of them has a positive effect on quality and the other
a negative one, and that the combined effect could be either positive
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or negative. Thus I do not endorse the second argument in general.
However, I do endorse this argument for certain fields, for which I
argue that the positive effect does not apply.
1 Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By
making the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and
which papers do not, they have a significant influence on what work is given
attention and what work is ignored in their field (Crane 1967).
In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be
informed about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to
publish a particular paper? Under a single- or double-anonymous reviewing
procedure, the editor knows who the author of each submitted paper is.1
Under a triple-anonymous reviewing procedure, the author’s name and affil-
iation are hidden from the editor unless and until the paper is accepted for
publication. So the question is: should journals practice triple-anonymous
reviewing?2
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-anonymous
reviewing. One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On
this kind of argument, revealing identity information to the editor will lead
the editor to (partially) base her judgment on irrelevant information. This
is unfair to the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument highlights the effect on the journal and its
1The difference is that under a single-anonymous procedure any reviewers who advise
on the publishability of the paper are informed about the identity of the author, whereas
under a double-anonymous procedure the reviewers are not told who the author is. The
identity of the reviewers is kept hidden from the author regardless of whether a single-,
double-, or triple-anonymous procedure is used.
2The relevant procedures are often called single-, double-, and triple-blind reviewing. I
avoid this terminology as it has been criticized for being ableist (Tremain 2017, introduc-
tion).
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readers. Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity
information if given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that
as a result the journal will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to
accept or reject a paper is influenced by the editor’s biases, this suggests that
a departure has been made from a putative “objectively correct” decision.
This harms the readers of the journal, and is thus bad.3
This paper assesses these arguments. I distinguish between two different
ways the editor’s judgment may be affected if the author’s identity is revealed
to her. First, the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors
she does not know, a phenomenon I will call connection bias. Second, the
editor may treat authors differently based on some aspect of their identity
(e.g., their gender), which I will call identity bias. I make the following three
claims.
My first claim is that connection bias actually benefits rather than harms
the readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a reduction in editorial
uncertainty about the quality of submitted papers. I construct a model to
show in a formally precise way how such a benefit might arise—surprisingly,
no assumption that the scientists the editor knows are “better scientists” is
required—and I cite empirical evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise.
However, this benefit only applies in certain fields; I argue that mathematics
and parts of the humanities are excluded (section 2).
My second claim is that whenever connection bias or identity bias affects
an editorial decision, this constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of
Fricker (2007) against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epis-
temically) just, she should prevent these biases from operating, which can
be done through triple-anonymous reviewing. So I endorse an argument of
3Hence, I distinguish between the effects of triple-anonymous reviewing on the author
and on the readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding that in order to
study the social epistemology of science, what is good for an individual inquirer must be
distinguished from what is good for the wider scientific community (Kitcher 1993, Strevens
2003, Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011).
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the first of the two kinds I identified above: triple-anonymous reviewing is
preferable because not doing so is unfair to authors (sections 3 and 4).
My third claim is that whether editorial biases harm the journal and its
readers depends on a number of factors. Connection bias benefits readers,
whereas identity bias harms them. Whether there is an overall benefit or
harm depends on the strength of the editor’s identity bias, the relative sizes
of the different groups, and other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As
a result I do not in general endorse the second kind of argument, that triple-
anonymous reviewing is preferable because readers of the journal are harmed
otherwise. However, I do endorse this argument for fields like mathematics,
where I claim that the benefits of connection bias do not apply (section 5).
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on
the number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication,
but he does not focus specifically on the editor’s decisions. Economists have
studied models in which editorial decisions play an important role (Ellison
2002, Faria 2005, Besancenot et al. 2012), but they have not been concerned
with biases the editor may be subject to. Other economists have done empir-
ical work investigating the differences between papers with and without an
author-editor connection (Laband and Piette 1994, Medoff 2003, Smith and
Dombrowski 1998, more on this later), but they do not provide a model that
can explain these differences. This paper thus fills a gap in the literature.
I compare double- and triple-anonymous reviewing as opposed to single-
and double-anonymous reviewing. The latter comparison has been studied
extensively, see Blank (1991) for a prominent empirical study and Snodgrass
(2006) and Lee et al. (2013, especially pp. 10–11) for literature reviews. In
contrast, I know of almost no empirical or theoretical work directly comparing
double- and triple-anonymous reviewing (one exception is Lee and Schunn
2010, p. 7).
While I focus on comparing double- and triple-anonymous review, some
of what I say may carry over to the context of comparing single- and double-
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anonymous review. In section 5 I comment briefly on the extent to which
the formal model I present applies in the context of comparing single- and
double-anonymous review. However, I leave it to the reader to judge to what
extent the arguments I make on the basis of the model carry over.
2 A Model of Connection Bias
As mentioned, journal editors have a certain measure of power in a scientific
community because they decide which papers get published.4 An editor
could use this power to the benefit of her friends or colleagues, or to promote
certain subfields or methodologies over others. This phenomenon has been
called editorial favoritism.
Bailey et al. (2008a,b) find that academics believe editorial favoritism
to be fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage claiming to have per-
ceived it firsthand. Hull (1988, chapter 9) finds a limited degree of favoritism
in his study of reviewing practices at the journal Systematic Zoology. And
Laband (1985) and Piette and Ross (1992) find that papers whose author
has a connection to the journal editor are allocated more journal pages than
papers by authors without such a connection.5
In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to
accept papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not
know as connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989, Bailey
et al. 2008a,b). In both studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were asked
4Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors
make the final decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define “the editor” to
be whomever makes the final decision whether to publish a particular paper.
5Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors’ willingness to push the
paper. The more obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is
accepted for publication. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies which measure the
influence of author-editor relationships on acceptance decisions directly. Presumably this
is because information about rejected papers is usually not available.
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to rate the seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by editors
and reviewers, this disapproval was shown to be part of a general and strong
disapproval of “selfish or cliquish acts” in the peer review process.6 Thus it
appears that the reason academics disapprove of connection bias is that it
shows the editor acting on private interests, whereas disinterestedness is the
norm in science (Merton 1942).
On the other hand, there is some evidence that connection bias improves
the overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and Piette 1994, Medoff 2003,
Smith and Dombrowski 1998). Does this mean scientists are misguided in
their disapproval?
In this section, I use a formal model to show that editors may display
connection bias even if their only goal is to accept the best papers, and that
this may improve quality, consistent with Laband and Piette’s, Medoff’s,
and Smith and Dombrowski’s findings. Note that in this section I discuss
connection bias only. Subsequent sections discuss identity bias.
Consider a simplified scientific community. Each scientist produces a
paper and submits it to the community’s only journal which has one editor.
Some papers are more suitable for publication than others. I assume that
this suitability can be measured on a single numerical scale. For convenience
I call this the quality of the paper. However, I remain neutral on how this
notion should be interpreted, e.g., as an objective measure of the epistemic
value of the paper, or as the number of times the paper would be cited in
future papers if it was published, or as the average subjective value each
member of the scientific community would assign to it if they read it.7
6This evidence conflicts to some extent with other survey findings. If connection bias
was a serious worry for working scientists, one would expect them to rank knowing the ed-
itor and the composition of the editorial board more generally among the most important
factors in deciding where to submit their papers. But Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find
that this is not the case (these factors are ranked twelfth and sixteenth in a list of sixteen
potentially relevant factors in their survey). In a similar survey by Mackie (1998, chap-
ter 4), twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her preferences
is an important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
7See Bright (2017) for more on potential difficulties with the notion of quality.
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Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time it
is submitted. This section aims to show how uncertainty about quality can
lead to connection bias. To make this point, I assume that the editor cares
only about quality, i.e., she makes an estimate of the quality of a paper and
publishes those and only those papers whose quality estimate is high.
Let qi be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. qi is modeled as
a random variable to reflect uncertainty about quality. Since some scientists
are more likely to produce high quality papers than others, the mean µi of
this random variable may be different for each scientist. I assume that quality
follows a normal distribution with fixed variance: qi | µi ∼ N(µi, σ2in) (read:
“qi given µi follows a normal distribution with mean µi and variance σ2in”;
the subscript in indicates that this is the variance in the quality of individual
papers by the same author).
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to
keep the mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the dis-
tribution of average quality in the scientific community and the distribution
of reviewers’ estimates of the quality of a paper. The results below likely
hold under many different distributional assumptions.8
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the av-
erage quality of scientist i’s work. This is reflected in the model by assuming
that the editor knows the value of µi. In contrast, the editor is uncertain
about the average quality of the work of scientists she does not know. All she
knows is the distribution of average quality in the larger scientific community,
which I also assume to be normal: µi ∼ N(µ, σ2sc).
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: average
paper quality follows the same distribution in the two groups of scientists
(those known to the editor and those not known to the editor). If I assumed
instead that scientists known to the editor write better papers on average the
results would be qualitatively similar to those I present below. If scientists
8This claim is made precise and proved in Heesen and Romeijn (2017).
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known to the editor write worse papers on average this would affect my
results. However, since most journal editors are relatively central figures in
their field (Crane 1967), this seems implausible for most cases.
The editor’s prior for the quality of a paper submitted by some scientist i
reflects this difference in information. If she knows the scientist she knows the
value of µi, and so her prior is pi(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi, σ2in). If the editor does not
know scientist i she is uncertain about µi. Integrating out this uncertainty
yields a prior pi(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ2in + σ2sc) for the quality of scientist i’s paper.
When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. The reviewer
provides an estimate ri of the paper’s quality which is again a random vari-
able. I assume that the reviewer’s report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the
actual quality qi of the paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to
reflect uncertainty: ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ2rv).9
The editor uses the information from the reviewer’s report to update
her beliefs. I assume that she does this by conditioning on ri. Thus, her
posterior for the quality of scientist i’s paper is pi(qi | ri) if she does not
know the author, and pi(qi | ri, µi) if she does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose
mean is a weighted average of ri and the prior mean (see proposition 5 in
appendix A). I write µUi for the mean of the posterior distribution if the
editor does not know scientist i and µKi if she does.
I assume that the editor publishes any paper whose (posterior) expected
quality is above some threshold q∗. So a paper written by a scientist unknown
9The reviewer’s report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged
opinion of multiple reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which case
the report reflects her findings which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs about
the quality of the paper. The assumption I make in the text covers these scenarios, as long
as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of reviewers used. Some journals may
use different numbers of reviewers for different papers (potentially affecting the variance if
more reviewers give more accurate information than fewer) or employ reviewers in different
roles (e.g., one reviewer to assess technical aspects of the paper and one reviewer to assess
non-technical aspects). My model does not apply to journals where these differences
correlate with the existence or absence of a connection between editor and author.
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to the editor is published if µUi > q∗ and a paper written by a scientist known
to the editor is published if µKi > q∗. Other standards could be used: risk-
averse standards might require high (greater than 50 %) confidence that the
paper is above some threshold. For the qualitative results presented here this
makes no difference (see proposition 7 in appendix A).
The first theorem establishes the existence of connection bias in the model
(refer to appendix A for all proofs). It says that the editor is more likely to
publish a paper written by an arbitrary author she knows than a paper
written by an arbitrary author she does not know, whenever q∗ > µ (for any
positive value of σ2sc and σ2rv). The condition amounts to a requirement that
the journal’s acceptance rate is less than 50 %. This is true of most reputable
journals in most fields (physics being a notable exception).
Theorem 1 (Connection Bias). If q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the accep-
tance probability for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance
probability for authors unknown to the editor, i.e., Pr(µKi > q∗) > Pr(µUi >
q∗).
Theorem 1 shows that in my model any journal with an acceptance rate
lower than 50 % will be seen to display connection bias. Thus I have estab-
lished the surprising result that an editor who cares only about the quality of
the papers she publishes may end up publishing more papers by her friends
and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her friends and
colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average.10
Why does this surprising result hold? The distribution of the posterior
mean µUi has lower variance than the distribution of µKi (see proposition 6 in
appendix A). That is, the variance of µUi is lower in an “objective” sense: this
is not a claim about the editor’s subjective uncertainty about her judgment.
This is because µUi is a weighted average of µ and ri, keeping it relatively
10The model presented in this section is formally similar to that of Miller (1994) and
Borsboom et al. (2008). They assume genuine differences in average quality between
groups, so a result like theorem 1 is true but unsurprising in their models.
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close to the overall mean µ compared to µKi , which is a weighted average of
µi and ri (which tend to differ from µ in the same direction).
Note that the result assumes that scientists known to the editor and sci-
entists unknown to the editor are held to the same “standard” (the thresh-
old q∗). Alternatively, the editor might enforce equal acceptance rates for
the two groups. This would be formally equivalent to raising the threshold
for known scientists (or lowering the threshold for unknown scientists).
Theorem 1 describes a subjective effect: an editor who uses information
about the average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows will
believe that scientists she knows produce on average more papers that meet
her quality threshold. Does this translate into an objective effect?
In order to answer this question I compare the average quality of accepted
papers, or more formally, the expected value of the quality of a paper, con-
ditional on meeting the publication threshold, given that the author is either
known to the editor or not.
Theorem 2 (Positive Effect of Connection Bias). If σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0,
the average quality of accepted papers from authors known to the editor is
higher than the average quality of accepted papers from authors unknown to
the editor, i.e., E[qi | µKi > q∗] > E[qi | µUi > q∗].
The editor’s knowledge of the average quality of papers written by sci-
entists she knows makes it such that among those scientists relatively many
whose papers are accepted have relatively high average quality. Since this
correlates with paper quality the average quality of accepted papers in this
group is relatively high, yielding theorem 2.
The theorem shows that the editor can use the extra information she
has about scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers
published in her journal. The surprising result, then, is that the editor’s
connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the readers of the journal.
In other words, the editor can use her connections to “identify and capture
high-quality papers”, as Laband and Piette (1994) suggest.
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To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in re-
ality is the result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to
editors using their position of power to help their friends? At this point the
model yields an empirical prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due
to capturing high-quality papers, the quality of papers by authors the editor
knows should be higher than average, as shown in the model. If, on the other
hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of the editor accepting for pub-
lication papers written by authors she knows even though they do not meet
the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of papers by authors
the editor knows should be lower than average.
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality11 of a paper,
a simple regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors
with an author-editor connection have higher or lower average quality than
papers without such a connection. This empirical test has been carried out a
number of times, and the results favor the hypothesis that editors use their
connections to improve the quality of published papers (Laband and Piette
1994, Smith and Dombrowski 1998, Medoff 2003).12
Note that in the above (qualitative) results, nothing depends on the sizes
of the variances σ2in, σ2sc, and σ2rv. The values of the variances do matter
when the acceptance rate and average quality of papers are compared quan-
titatively. For example, reducing σ2rv (making the reviewer’s report more
11Recall that I have remained neutral on how the notion of quality should be inter-
preted. If quality is simply defined as “the number of citations this paper would get if it
were published” the connection between quality and citations is obvious. Even on other
interpretations of quality, citations have frequently been viewed as a good proxy measure
(Cole and Cole 1967, 1968, Medoff 2003). This practice has been defended by Cole and
Cole (1971) and Clark (1957, chapter 3), and criticized by Lindsey (1989) and Heesen
(forthcoming).
12Laband and Piette and Medoff focus on economics journals and Smith and Dom-
browski on accounting journals. Further research would be valuable to see whether these
results generalize, especially to the natural sciences and the humanities. Note also that
these results do not rule out the possibility that editors use their power to help their
friends: they merely suggest that on balance editors’ use of connections has a positive
effect on citations.
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accurate) reduces the differences in the acceptance rate and average quality
of papers.
Note also that the results depend on the assumption that σ2sc and σ2rv are
positive. What is the significance of these assumptions?
If σ2rv = 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer’s report, the reviewer
reports the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In this case the “extra
information” the editor has about authors she knows is not needed, and so
there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based on whether
the editor knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to expect reviewer’s
reports to be this accurate.
If σ2sc = 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers
produced by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not
tell the editor anything about the expected quality of that scientist’s work.
In this case there is no value to the editor (with regard to determining the
quality of the submitted paper) in learning the identity of the author. So
here there is also no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based
on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected
to tell the editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper?
This seems to be most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of
the author, and hence the lab at which the experiments were performed, can
increase or decrease the editor’s confidence that the experiments were per-
formed correctly, including all the little checks and details that are impossible
to describe in a paper. In such cases, “the reader must rely on the author’s
(and perhaps referee’s) testimony that the author really performed the ex-
periment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out as reported” (Easwaran
2009, p. 359).
But in other fields, in particular mathematics and those parts of the
humanities that focus on abstract arguments, there is no need to rely on
the author’s reputation. This is because in these fields the paper itself is
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the contribution, so it is possible to judge papers in isolation of how or by
whom they were created (Easwaran 2009). And in fact there exists a norm
that this is how they should be judged: “Papers will rely only on premises
that the competent reader can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only
make inferences that the competent reader would be expected to accept on
her own consideration.” (Easwaran 2009, p. 354).
Arguably then, the epistemic advantage conferred by revealing identity
information about the author to the editor applies only in certain fields.
The relevant fields are those where part of the information in the paper is
conferred on the authority of testimony. In mathematics and parts of the
humanities, where a careful reading of a paper itself constitutes a reproduc-
tion of its argument, there is no relevant information to be learned from the
identity of the author (i.e., σ2sc = 0). Or at least the publishing norms in
these fields suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
3 Connection Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about
paper quality. I first established the existence of connection bias in this
model. Then I showed that connection bias benefits the readers of the journal,
insofar as readers care about the quality of accepted papers. Despite this
benefit to readers, I claim that connection bias is unfair to authors. In this
section I argue this claim by appealing to the concept of epistemic injustice,
as developed by Fricker (2007).
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice.
Fricker (2007, pp. 17–23) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where
a speaker suffers a credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and
epistemically culpable.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly
interested in what she calls “the central case of testimonial injustice” (Fricker
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2007, p. 28). This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and
one or more attributes, where this association embodies a gen-
eralization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable)
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective
investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35)
Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial
injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many
different social spheres.
It is clear that connection bias is not an instance of the central case of
testimonial injustice. This would require some negative stereotype associated
with scientists unknown to the editor (as a group) which does not normally
exist. So I set the central case aside (I return to it in section 4) and focus
on the question whether connection bias can produce (non-central cases of)
testimonial injustice.
How are individual scientists affected by the differential acceptance rates
established in section 2? For scientist i, the probability of acceptance given
the average quality of her papers µi denotes the long-run average proportion
of her papers that will be accepted (assuming she submits all her papers to
the journal).
Theorem 3 (Acceptance Rate for Individual Authors). Assume σ2sc > 0 and
σ2rv > 0. The acceptance rate for author i (with average quality µi) is higher if
the editor knows her if and only if µi exceeds a weighted average of µ and q∗:
Pr
(
µKi > q
∗ | µi
)
≥ Pr
(
µUi > q
∗ | µi
)
iff µi ≥ σ
2
in
σ2in + σ2sc
µ+ σ
2
sc
σ2in + σ2sc
q∗.
The strict version is true as well, i.e., if the editor knows scientist i she is
strictly better off if and only if µi strictly exceeds the weighted average.
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Note that regardless of the values of the variances, any scientist whose
average quality exceeds the threshold value (µi ≥ q∗) benefits from connec-
tion bias. Conversely, a scientist of below average quality (µi ≤ µ) is actually
worse off if the editor knows her.13
Consider what this theorem says for a particular scientist i who is un-
known to the editor and whose average quality µi strictly exceeds the weighted
average. Some of her papers are rejected even though they would have been
accepted if the editor knew her. In Fricker’s terminology, scientist i suffers
from a credibility deficit: fewer of her papers are considered credible (i.e.,
publishable) by the editor than would have been considered credible if the
editor knew her.
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically
culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, the editor is simply
making maximal use of the information available to her. It just so happens
that she has more information about scientists she knows than about others.
But that is hardly the editor’s fault. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know
the work of every scientist who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove
all information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done
by using a triple-anonymous reviewing procedure, in which the editor is pre-
vented from using information about scientists she knows in her evaluation.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for cred-
ibility deficits suffered by scientists unknown to the editor whose average
quality exceeds the weighted average specified in theorem 3, and hence testi-
monial injustices are committed against such authors when a double-anony-
mous reviewing procedure is used. A similar epistemic injustice occurs for
scientists known to the editor whose average quality is below the weighted
average, as such authors would prefer that the editor not use information she
13These claims assume that q∗ > µ. Note also that only a minority of authors benefits
from connection bias, as half of all authors satisfy µi ≤ µ.
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has about their average quality.
It is worth noting explicitly which scientists are better or worse off in
terms of acceptance rates if a triple-anonymous procedure is introduced. If
the acceptance threshold q∗ is held constant14, nothing changes for scientists
unknown to the editor. Scientists known to the editor will see their accep-
tance rate go down if their average quality exceeds the weighted average
specified in theorem 3, and up otherwise. The overall acceptance rate of the
journal will go down (by theorem 1).
So the group that I based my argument on (unknown scientists of high
average quality) is not necessarily made better off by switching to triple-
anonymous reviewing. The argument for triple-anonymous reviewing given
in this section is not about benefiting one group of scientists or harming
another: rather, it is about fairness. Under a triple-anonymous procedure,
at least all scientists are treated equally: any scientist who writes a paper of
a given quality has the same chance of seeing that paper accepted. Whereas
under a double-anonymous procedure, scientists are treated unfairly in that
their acceptance rates may differ based only on an epistemically irrelevant
characteristic (knowing the editor).
I conclude that while journal readers may benefit from connection bias, it
involves unfair treatment of authors. Because this unfair treatment takes the
form of an epistemic injustice, which involves both ethically and epistemically
culpable behavior, connection bias has both an epistemic benefit (to readers)
and a cost (to the author). It would be a misinterpretation of my analysis,
14Things are slightly more subtle if the overall acceptance rate of the journal is held
constant instead. The threshold will go down, say to q∗∗ < q∗, and hence all scientists
unknown to the editor will see their acceptance rates go up, as Pr(µUi > q∗∗ | µi) >
Pr(µUi > q∗ | µi) for all values of µi. The acceptance rate for known scientists must
correspondingly go down, but the effect on an individual known scientist i depends on µi.
In particular, Pr(µKi > q∗ | µi) ≥ Pr(µUi > q∗∗ | µi) iff
µi ≥ σ
2
in
σ2in + σ2sc
µ+ σ
2
sc
σ2in + σ2sc
q∗ + σ
2
in
σ2in + σ2sc
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
σ2rv
(q∗ − q∗∗).
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then, to conclude that connection bias is epistemically good but ethically
bad.
4 Identity Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
So far, I have assumed that connection bias is the only bias journal editors
display. The literature on implicit bias suggests further biases: “[i]f sub-
missions are not anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that
women’s work will probably be judged more negatively than men’s work of
the same quality” (Saul 2013, p. 45). Evidence for this claim is given by Wen-
nerås and Wold (1997), Valian (1999, chapter 11), Steinpreis et al. (1999),
Budden et al. (2008), and Moss-Racusin et al. (2012).15 So women scientists
are at a disadvantage simply because of their gender identity. Similar biases
exist based on other irrelevant aspects of scientists’ identity, such as race or
sexual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013 for a critical survey of various biases in
the peer review system). As Crandall (1982, p. 208) puts it: “The editorial
process has tended to be run as an informal, old-boy network which has ex-
cluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and those from lower-prestige
institutions”.16
I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. I now complicate
the model of section 2 to include identity bias. I then argue that allowing
the editor’s decisions to be influenced by identity bias is unfair to authors,
analogous to the argument of the previous section.
I incorporate identity bias in the model by assuming the editor consis-
tently undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the others). More
15These citations show that the work of women in academia is undervalued in various
ways. None of them focus on editor evaluations, but they support Saul’s claim unless it is
assumed that journal editors as a group are significantly less biased than other academics.
16The latter case is arguably different from the others, as academic affiliation is not as
clearly irrelevant as gender or race: many would argue it is a valid signal of quality. I am
inclined to think bias based on academic affiliation involves epistemic injustice, but I leave
arguing this point in detail to future work.
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precisely, she believes the average quality of papers produced by any scien-
tist i from the group she is biased against to be lower than it really is by
some constant quantity ε. Conversely, she raises the average quality of pa-
pers written by any scientist not belonging to this group by δ.17 So the editor
has a different prior for the two groups; I use piA to denote her prior for the
quality of papers written by scientists she is biased against, and piF for her
prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may know a given scientist or not. So there are
now four groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the
stigmatized group the editor’s prior distribution on the quality of scientist i’s
paper is piA(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi − ε, σ2in). If scientist i is known to the editor but
is not in the stigmatized group the prior is piF (qi | µi) ∼ N(µi + δ, σ2in). If
scientist i is not known to the editor and is in the stigmatized group the prior
is piA(qi) ∼ N(µ− ε, σ2in + σ2sc). And if scientist i is not known to the editor
and not in the stigmatized group the prior is piF (qi) ∼ N(µ+ δ, σ2in + σ2sc).18
After the reviewer’s report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about
the quality of the paper. This yields posterior distributions piA(qi | ri, µi),
piF (qi | ri, µi), piA(qi | ri), and piF (qi | ri), with posterior means µKAi , µKFi ,
µUAi , and µUFi , respectively. As before, the paper is published if the posterior
mean exceeds the threshold q∗. This yields the unsurprising result that the
editor is less likely to publish papers by scientists she is biased against.
17This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple
groups of different strengths, biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases
which intersect in various ways (Collins and Chepp 2013, Bright et al. 2016). However, the
assumption in the main text suffices for my purposes. It should be fairly straightforward
to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones just described.
18Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized
group regardless of whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is
not triple-anonymous, the editor learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist
who submits a paper. This information is usually sufficient to determine with reason-
able certainty the scientist’s gender. So at least for gender bias it seems reasonable to
expect the editor to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely,
because negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem
reasonable to expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows.
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Theorem 4 (Identity Bias). If ε > 0, δ > 019, σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the
acceptance probability for authors the editor is biased against is lower than
the acceptance probability for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping
fixed whether or not the editor knows the author). That is,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗) < Pr (µKFi > q∗) and Pr (µUAi > q∗) < Pr (µUFi > q∗) .
Theorem 4 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors
that the editor is biased against are less likely to see their paper accepted
than other authors.
Any time a paper is rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper
would have been accepted if the relevant part of the author’s identity had
been different, all else being equal), a testimonial injustice occurs.
Testimonial injustices resulting from identity bias can be instances of the
central case of testimonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results
from a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that
negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men)
judge women’s work, even when one does not consciously believe in these
stereotypes. Moreover, those who think highly of their ability to judge work
objectively and/or are primed with objectivity are affected more rather than
less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007, Stewart and Payne 2008, p. 1333). Similar
claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or sexual orientation.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices
against authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that it is unfair
to authors when journal editors do not use a triple-anonymous reviewing
procedure. This constitutes the first kind of argument for triple-anonymous
reviewing which I mentioned in the introduction, and which I endorse based
on these considerations.
19While the assumption that ε and δ are both positive is sensible given the intended
interpretation, it is not required from a mathematical perspective: ε + δ > 0 suffices for
this theorem. See the proof in appendix A.
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5 The Tradeoff Between Connection Bias and
Identity Bias
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that
failing to use triple-anonymous reviewing harms the journal and its readers,
because it would lower the average quality of accepted papers. In section 2
I argued that connection bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases
average quality. Identity bias complicates the picture, as it generally lowers
the average quality of accepted papers. This raises the question whether the
combined effect of connection bias and identity bias is positive or negative.
In this section I show that there is no general answer to this question.
I compare the average quality of accepted papers under a procedure sub-
ject to connection bias and identity bias to that under a triple-anonymous
reviewing procedure. Under this procedure, the editor’s prior distribution
for the quality of any submitted paper is pi(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ2in + σ2sc), i.e., the
prior for unknown authors from section 2. Hence the posterior is pi(qi | ri)
with mean µUi , the probability of acceptance is Pr(µUi > q∗) and the average
quality of accepted papers is E[qi | µUi > q∗]. As a result, the editor displays
neither connection bias nor identity bias.
In contrast, the double-anonymous reviewing procedure is subject to con-
nection bias and identity bias. The overall probability that a paper is ac-
cepted under this procedure depends on the relative sizes of the four groups.
I use pKA to denote the fraction of scientists known to the editor that she is
biased against, pKF for the fraction known to the editor that she is biased
in favor of, pUA for unknown scientists biased against, and pUF for unknown
scientists biased in favor of (pKA + pKF + pUA + pUF = 1).
Let Ai denote the event that scientist i’s paper is accepted under the
double-anonymous procedure. The overall probability of acceptance is
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Pr (Ai) = pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗)+ pKF Pr (µKFi > q∗)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗)+ pUF Pr (µUFi > q∗) ,
and the average quality of accepted papers is E[qi | Ai].20
In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor’s biases are such
that she believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal to the
overall average µ. In other words, her bias against women21 is canceled out
on average by her bias in favor of men, weighted by the relative sizes of those
groups: (pKA + pUA)ε = (pKF + pUF )δ. Given the other parameter values,
this fixes the value of δ. This is a kind of commensurability requirement
for the two procedures because it guarantees that the editor perceives the
average quality of submitted papers to be µ regardless of which reviewing
procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the
parameters that determine whether the double-anonymous procedure or the
triple-anonymous procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted
papers. The question I explore next, using some numerical examples, is how
biased the editor needs to be for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to
outweigh the epistemic benefits resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the
parameters. First I set µ = 0 and q∗ = 2. Since quality is an interval scale in
this model, these choices are arbitrary. For the variances σ2in (of the quality
of individual papers), σ2sc (of the average quality of authors), and σ2rv (of the
accuracy of the reviewer’s report), I choose a “small” and a “large” value
(1 and 4 respectively).
20Expressions for Pr(Ai) and E[qi | Ai] using only the parameter values and standard
functions are given in proposition 14 in appendix A. These expressions are used to generate
the numerical results below.
21For ease of exposition, in the remainder of this section I assume that the specific form
of identity bias the editor displays is gender bias against women.
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For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that the percentage of women
among scientists the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among
scientists the editor does not know. I consider two cases for the editor’s
identity bias: either half of all authors are women or women are a 30 %
minority.22 Similarly, I consider the case in which the editor knows half of
all scientists submitting papers, and the case in which the editor knows 30 %
of them. As a result, there are 32 possible settings of the parameters (23
choices for the variances times 22 choices for the group sizes).
It follows from theorem 2 that when ε = 0 the double-anonymous proce-
dure helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing aver-
age quality relative to the triple-anonymous procedure. If ε is positive but
relatively small, this remains true, but when ε is relatively big, the double-
anonymous procedure harms the readers. This is because the average quality
of published papers under the double-anonymous procedure decreases con-
tinuously as ε increases.
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big
does the editor’s bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity
bias on quality to cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
I determine the value of ε for which the average quality of published
papers under the double-anonymous procedure and the triple-anonymous
procedure is the same. Figure 1 reports these numbers. I plot them against
the acceptance rate that the triple-anonymous procedure would have for those
values of the parameters. The bias ε is measured in “quality points” (for
reference: since µ = 0 and q∗ = 2, a paper needs to be two quality points
above average to be accepted).
The variances determine the acceptance rate of the triple-anonymous
22Bruner and O’Connor (2017) note that certain dynamics in academic life can lead to
identity bias against groups as a result of the mere fact that they are a minority. Here
I consider both the case where women are a minority (and are possibly stigmatized as a
result of being a minority, as Bruner and O’Connor suggest) and the case where they are
not (and so the negative identity-prejudicial stereotype has some other source).
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Figure 1: The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs of
the double-anonymous procedure outweigh its benefits (measured in “quality
points”), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the acceptance rate of the
corresponding triple-anonymous procedure.
procedure. The eight possible settings correspond to six acceptance rates:
0.72 %, 4.16 %, 11.51 %, 16.36 %, 19.32 %, and 22.66 %. The four differ-
ent settings for the group sizes are indicated through the different shapes
of the data points in figure 1. X’es indicate all groups are of equal size
(pKA = pKF = pUA = pUF = 0.25), circles indicate women are a minority,
pluses indicate authors known to the editor are a minority, and diamonds
indicate both women and known authors are a minority.
Since quality points do not have a clear interpretation outside the context
of the model, I use the values of ε shown in figure 1 to calculate the aver-
age rate of acceptance of papers authored by women and the average rate
of acceptance of papers authored by men.23 The difference between these
numbers gives an indication of the size of the editor’s bias: it measures (in
23These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not.
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percentage points, abbreviated pp) how many more papers the editor accepts
from men, compared to women.
These differences are reported in figure 2. Even with this small sample
of 32 cases, a large variation of results can be observed. I illustrate this by
looking at two cases in detail.
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Figure 2: The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs of
the double-anonymous procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage
point difference in acceptance rates).
First, suppose that σ2in = σ2sc = 1 and σ2rv = 4, so there is relatively little
variation in the quality of individual papers and in the average quality of
authors but relatively high variation in reviewer estimates of quality. Then
the triple-anonymous procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72 %. If
In particular, the rates of acceptance for women and men are respectively
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗)+ pUA Pr (µUAi > q∗)
pKA + pUA
and
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗)+ pUF Pr (µUFi > q∗)
pKF + pUF
.
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the groups are all of equal size then under the double-anonymous procedure
the acceptance rate for men needs to be as much as 2.66 pp higher than the
acceptance rate for women, in order for the average quality under the two
procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very large for a journal that
only accepts less than 1 % of papers. If the bias is any less than that there
is no harm to the readers in using the double-anonymous procedure.
Second, suppose that σ2in = σ2sc = 4 and σ2rv = 1, so the variation in quality
of both papers and authors is relatively high but reviewers’ estimates are
relatively accurate. Then the triple-anonymous procedure has an acceptance
rate of 22.66 %. If, moreover, the editor knows relatively few authors then
the quality costs of the double-anonymous procedure outweigh its benefits
whenever the acceptance rate for men is more than 2.23 pp higher than the
acceptance rate for women. For a journal accepting about 23 % of papers
that means that even if the gender bias of the editor is relatively mild the
journal’s readers are harmed if the double-anonymous procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are un-
likely to be known in practice, it is unclear whether the double-anonymous
procedure or the triple-anonymous procedure will lead to a higher average
quality of published papers for any particular journal.24 So in general it is
not clear that an argument that the double-anonymous procedure harms the
journal’s readers can be made. At the same time, a general argument that
the double-anonymous procedure helps the readers is not available either.
Given this, I am inclined to recommend a triple-anonymous procedure for all
journals because not doing so is unfair to authors.
One might be tempted to draw a different policy recommendation from
this paper: use triple-anonymous review to prevent the negative effects of
identity bias on quality, but provide the editor with the author’s h-index or
24Note that the evidence collected by Laband and Piette (1994) does not help settle this
question, as they do not directly compare the triple-anonymous and the double-anonymous
procedure. Their evidence supports a positive effect of connection bias, but not a verdict
on the overall effect of triple-anonymizing on quality.
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some other citation index to benefit from the reduced uncertainty associated
with knowing an author’s average quality. I do not endorse this sugges-
tion for at least two reasons. First, it is unfair to authors as discussed in
section 3. Second, depending on one’s interpretation of quality, it may be
difficult or impossible to infer author quality from citations (Lindsey 1989,
Heesen forthcoming, Bright 2017).
I have argued in this section that the net effect of connection bias and
identity bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in section 2 that the positive
effect of connection bias only exists in certain fields. In fields where papers
rely partially on the author’s testimony there is value in knowing the identity
of the author. But in other fields such as mathematics and parts of the
humanities testimony is not taken to play a role—the paper itself constitutes
the contribution to the field—and so arguably there is no value in knowing
the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias,
but there is still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest
case for the triple-anonymous procedure emerges, as the double-anonymous
procedure is both unfair to authors and harms readers.
I have focused on evaluating triple-anonymous review, in particular in
contrast to double-anonymous review. In many fields, particularly in the
natural sciences, single-anonymous review is the norm, and so the more per-
tinent question is whether they should switch to double-anonymous review.
Can the present model be used or adapted to address this question?
Analyzing a model in which both the editor and one or more reviewers
display connection bias and/or identity bias is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here I only discuss one relatively simple scenario: the case in which the editor
does not display identity bias but the reviewer does.
Suppose the reviewer is biased against one group, reducing reviewer esti-
mates of paper quality by ε if the author belongs to that group and raising
estimates by δ otherwise. If the editor knows the reviewer is biased, she can
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take the reviewer’s bias into account. In particular, if she knows which group
the reviewer is biased against and the size of the bias, learning the biased
reviewer estimate is equivalent to learning what the unbiased reviewer esti-
mate would have been, and so a rational unbiased editor simply updates on
the unbiased reviewer estimate. In this case reviewer bias has no effect on
acceptance decisions at all.
If the editor does not know the reviewer is biased, she may (naively)
treat the biased reviewer estimate as an unbiased estimate. In this case the
analysis is very similar to the one given above. A close analogue of theorem 4
holds. The only difference is that the effect of the variances is flipped. High
values of σ2in and σ2sc increase the consequences of the reviewer’s bias, while
high values of σ2rv reduce it. This is the reverse of what happens in the version
of the model I analyzed above (cf. proposition 12 in appendix A).
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-anonymous
review: one based on fairness considerations from the perspective of the
author and one based on the consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the double-anonymous procedure introduces differen-
tial treatment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to
publish papers by authors they know (connection bias, theorem 1) and less
likely to publish papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial
stereotypes to (identity bias, theorem 4). Whenever a paper is rejected as
a result of one of these biases an epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker
2007) is committed against the author. This is a fairness-based argument in
favor of triple-anonymizing.
From the readers’ perspective the story is more mixed, as connection
bias has a positive effect on the quality of published papers and identity
bias a negative one. Whether the readers are better off under the triple-
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anonymous procedure then depends on how these effects trade off, which
is highly context-dependent. This yields a more nuanced view than that
suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994), who focus only on connection
bias, or by an argument for triple-anonymizing which focuses only on identity
bias.
However, in mathematics and parts of the humanities there is arguably
no positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author’s
other work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009). So here the negative
effect of identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers’ per-
spective. In this situation, considerations concerning fairness for the author
and considerations concerning the consequences for the readers point in the
same direction: in favor of triple-anonymous review.
A Acceptance Rates and Average Quality
The following properties of the normal distribution will be useful (see, e.g.,
Johnson et al. 1994, chapter 13, section 3). Let X ∼ N(m, s2). Then the
moment-generating function of X is given by
E [exp {tX}] = exp
{
mt+ 12s
2t2
}
. (1)
Let Y = aX + b (with a 6= 0). Then
Y ∼ N
(
am+ b, a2s2
)
. (2)
In particular, X−m
s
∼ N(0, 1) has a standard normal distribution, with den-
sity function φ and distribution function (or cumulative density function) Φ.
Proposition 5.
pi(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUi , σ
2
pi|r
)
and pi(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKi , σ
2
pi|rµ
)
,
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where
µUi =
σ2in + σ2sc
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
µ, σ2pi|r =
(
1
σ2in + σ2sc
+ 1
σ2rv
)−1
,
µKi =
σ2in
σ2in + σ2rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2in + σ2rv
µi, σ
2
pi|rµ =
(
1
σ2in
+ 1
σ2rv
)−1
.
See DeGroot (2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers Bayes-
ian statistics) for a proof of proposition 5. Note that σ2pi|r > σ2pi|rµ whenever
σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0.
Proposition 6. µUi ∼ N(µ, σ2U) and µKi ∼ N(µ, σ2K), where
σ2U =
(σ2in + σ2sc)2
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
and σ2K =
σ4in + σ2sc(σ2in + σ2rv)
σ2in + σ2rv
.
Moreover, if σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0, then σ2U < σ2K.
Proof. Since ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ2rv), qi | µi ∼ N(µi, σ2in), and µi ∼ N(µ, σ2sc), it
follows that ri | µi ∼ N(µi, σ2in + σ2rv) and ri ∼ N(µ, σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv).
Since µ is a constant, µUi is a linear transformation of ri. By equation 2
µUi is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2U .
For determining the distribution of µKi it is helpful first to define Xi =
µKi − µi = σ
2
in
σ2in+σ2rv
(ri − µi). Then Xi | µi ∼ N
(
0, σ
4
in
σ2in+σ2rv
)
by equation 2.
Now I find the distribution of µKi by using the moment-generating function
and the law of total expectation.
E[exp{tµKi }] = E[E[exp{tXi + tµi} | µi]]
= E[exp{tµi}E[exp{tXi} | µi]]
= exp
{
0t+ 12
σ4in
σ2in + σ2rv
t2
}
E[exp{tµi}]
= exp
{
µt+ 12
σ4in + σ2sc(σ2in + σ2rv)
σ2in + σ2rv
t2
}
.
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This establishes the distribution of µKi . Finally, note that
σ2U =
(σ2in + σ2sc)2(σ2in + σ2rv)
(σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv)(σ2in + σ2rv)
,
σ2K =
(σ2in + σ2sc)2(σ2in + σ2rv) + σ2scσ4rv
(σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv)(σ2in + σ2rv)
.
So σ2U < σ2K whenever σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0 (and σ2U = σ2K otherwise, assuming
either σ2in > 0 or σ2rv > 0).
Theorem 1. Pr(µKi > q∗) > Pr(µUi > q∗) if q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0.
Proof. It follows from proposition 6 that
Pr
(
µKi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(q∗ − µ
σK
)
and Pr
(
µUi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(q∗ − µ
σU
)
.
Since Φ is (strictly) increasing in its argument, and σK > σU by proposition 6,
the theorem follows immediately.
If the editor accepts papers only if her posterior confidence that qi > q∗ is
at least α (with 1/2 ≤ α < 1; the main text considers only the case α = 1/2),
a similar result holds. Let zα be the number such that Φ(zα) = α.
Proposition 7. Let σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0. If α ≥ 1/2 and q∗ + zασpi|r > µ
(so the acceptance rate for unknown scientists is less than 50 %), then
Pr
(
µKi − q∗
σpi|rµ
> zα
)
> Pr
(
µUi − q∗
σpi|r
> zα
)
.25
Proof. By proposition 6, µxi ∼ N(µ, σ2x) both for x = U and x = K. So
25To see that these are the correct acceptance rates, note that a paper by a scientist i
unknown to the editor is accepted if the editor’s posterior satisfies Pr(qi > q∗ | ri) > α
which is equivalent to 1 − Φ((q∗ − µUi )/σpi|r) > α by proposition 5. This is equivalent to
(µUi − q∗)/σpi|r > zα. Analogous reasoning applies to known scientists.
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Pr
(
µKi − q∗
σpi|rµ
> zα
)
= 1− Φ
(
zασpi|rµ + q∗ − µ
σK
)
,
Pr
(
µUi − q∗
σpi|r
> zα
)
= 1− Φ
(
zασpi|r + q∗ − µ
σU
)
.
The result follows because zα ≥ 0, σK > σU , and σpi|r > σpi|rµ.
Proposition 8.
E[qi | µUi > q∗] = E[µUi | µUi > q∗] and E[qi | µKi > q∗] = E[µKi | µKi > q∗].
Proof. Since µUi is simply an (invertible) transformation of ri,
qi | µUi ∼ qi | ri ∼ N
(
µUi , σ
2
pi|r
)
.
The distribution of qi | µKi is found using the moment-generating function
and the law of total expectation:
E[exp{tqi} | µKi ] = E[E[exp{tqi} | µi, µKi ] | µKi ]
= E[E[exp{tqi} | µi, ri] | µKi ]
= E
[
exp
{
µKi t+
1
2σ
2
pi|rµt
2
}
| µKi
]
= exp
{
µKi t+
1
2σ
2
pi|rµt
2
}
,
where the second equality follows because, if µi is given, µKi is simply an
invertible transformation of ri. So:
qi | µKi ∼ qi | ri, µi ∼ N
(
µKi , σ
2
pi|rµ
)
.
Now the law of total expectation can be used to establish (for x = U,K) that
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E[qi | µxi > q∗] = E[E[qi | µxi ] | µxi > q∗] = E[µxi | µxi > q∗].
LetX ∼ N(m, s2). ThenX | X > a follows a left-truncated normal distri-
bution, with left-truncation point a. According to, e.g., Johnson et al. (1994,
chapter 13, section 10.1), the mean of this distribution can be expressed as
E[X | X > a] = m+ sR
(
a−m
s
)
. (3)
Here R is defined for all x ∈ R by26
R(x) = φ(x)1− Φ(x) .
It follows from the definitions that R(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and that
R′(x) = R(x)2 − xR(x). (4)
Proposition 9 (Gordon 1941). For all x > 0, R(x) < x2+1
x
.
Proposition 10. If X ∼ N(m, s2) and Y ∼ N(m,σ2) with σ > s > 0 then
E[Y | Y > a] > E[X | X > a].
Proof. It suffices to show that the derivative ∂
∂s
E[X | X > a] is positive for
all s > 0. Differentiating equation (3) (using equation (4)) yields
∂
∂s
E[X | X > a] =
((
a−m
s
)2
+ 1
)
R
(
a−m
s
)
− a−m
s
R
(
a−m
s
)2
.
Since R(a−m
s
) > 0, ∂
∂s
E[X | X > a] > 0 if and only if
(
a−m
s
)2
+ 1− a−m
s
R
(
a−m
s
)
> 0.
26R is the inverse of what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills’ ratio.
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This is true whenever a−m
s
≤ 0 because then both terms in the sum are
positive. Proposition 9 guarantees that it is true whenever a−m
s
> 0.
Theorem 2. E[qi | µKi > q∗] > E[qi | µUi > q∗] whenever σ2sc > 0, and
σ2rv > 0.
Proof. By proposition 8,
E[qi | µUi > q∗] = E[µUi | µUi > q∗] and E[qi | µKi > q∗] = E[µKi | µKi > q∗].
By proposition 6, µUi ∼ N(µ, σ2U) and µKi ∼ N(µ, σ2K), with σU < σK . Hence
the conditions of proposition 10 are satisfied, and the result follows.
Proposition 11.
µKi | µi ∼ N
(
µi,
σ4in
σ2in + σ2rv
)
,
µUi | µi ∼ N
(
σ2in + σ2sc
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
µi +
σ2rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
µ,
(σ2in + σ2sc)2(σ2in + σ2rv)
(σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv)2
)
.
Proof. Since µi is given and hence behaves like a constant, both µKi and µUi
are simply linear transformations of ri, so both results follow from equation 2.
Theorem 3. Given σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0,
Pr
(
µKi > q
∗ | µi
)
≥ Pr
(
µUi > q
∗ | µi
)
⇔ µi ≥ σ
2
in
σ2in + σ2sc
µ+ σ
2
sc
σ2in + σ2sc
q∗.
Proof. Assume σ2sc > 0 and σ2rv > 0. Then27
27The expression for Pr(µKi > q∗ | µi) and the remainder of this proof assume that
σ2in > 0. If σ2in = 0 then the desired probability is one if µi > q∗ and zero otherwise. Since
0 < Pr(µUi > q∗ | µi) < 1, the result follows.
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Pr
(
µKi > q
∗ | µi
)
= 1− Φ

√
σ2in + σ2rv
σ2in
(q∗ − µi)
 ,
Pr
(
µUi > q
∗ | µi
)
= 1− Φ
(σ2in + σ2sc)(q∗ − µi) + σ2rv(q∗ − µ)
(σ2in + σ2sc)
√
σ2in + σ2rv
 .
So Pr(µKi > q∗ | µi) ≥ Pr(µUi > q∗ | µi) if and only if
(σ2in + σ2sc)(q∗ − µi) + σ2rv(q∗ − µ)
(σ2in + σ2sc)
√
σ2in + σ2rv
≥
√
σ2in + σ2rv
σ2in
(q∗ − µi).
Some algebra yields the result.
Proposition 12.
piA(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKAi , σ
2
pi|rµ
)
, piF (qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKFi , σ
2
pi|rµ
)
,
piA(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUAi , σ
2
pi|r
)
, piF (qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUFi , σ
2
pi|r
)
,
where
µKAi = µKi −
ε · σ2rv
σ2in + σ2rv
, µKFi = µKi +
δ · σ2rv
σ2in + σ2rv
,
µUAi = µUi −
ε · σ2rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
, µUFi = µUi +
δ · σ2rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
.
For a proof I refer once again to DeGroot (2004, section 9.5).
Proposition 13.
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ− ε · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+ δ · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2rv
, σ2K
)
,
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µUAi ∼ N
(
µ− ε · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+ δ · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
, σ2U
)
.
Proof. Since µKAi and µKFi are simply µKi shifted by a constant they follow
the same distribution as µKi except that its mean is shifted by the same
constant. Similarly µUAi and µUFi are just µUi shifted by a constant.
For notational convenience, I introduce qKA, qKF , qUA, and qUF , defined
by
qKA = q∗ + ε · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2rv
, qKF = q∗ − δ · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2rv
,
qUA = q∗ + ε · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
, qUF = q∗ − δ · σ
2
rv
σ2in + σ2sc + σ2rv
.
Theorem 4. If ε+ δ > 0, σ2sc > 0, and σ2rv > 0,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗) < Pr (µKFi > q∗) and Pr (µUAi > q∗) < Pr (µUFi > q∗) .
Proof. For the first inequality, note that
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(qKA − µ
σK
)
< 1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
= Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗) .
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established
in proposition 13. The inequality follows from the fact that Φ is strictly
increasing in its argument. By the same reasoning,
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Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗) = 1− Φ(qUA − µ
σU
)
< 1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
= Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗) .
Proposition 14.
Pr (Ai) = pKA
(
1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
))
+ pKF
(
1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ pUA
(
1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
))
+ pUF
(
1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
E [qi | Ai] = µ+ σKPr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ σUPr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
Proof. The expression for Pr(Ai) follows immediately from the distributions
of the posterior means established in proposition 13.
To get an expression for E[qi | Ai], consider first the average quality of
scientist i’s paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in the
group of scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against:
E
[
qi | µKAi > q∗
]
= E
[
µKi | µKi > qKA
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
,
where the first equality uses the fact that µKAi > q∗ is equivalent to µKi > qKA
and then applies proposition 8, and the second equality uses equation 3.
Similarly,
E
[
qi | µKFi > q∗
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
,
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E
[
qi | µUAi > q∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
,
E
[
qi | µUFi > q∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers E[qi | Ai] is a weighted sum of these
expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers
that are written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, au-
thors known to the editor that she is biased against form a pKA Pr(µKAi >
q∗)/Pr(Ai) proportion of accepted papers. Hence
E [qi | Ai] = 1Pr (Ai)pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗)E [qi | µKAi > q∗]
+ 1Pr (Ai)
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗)E [qi | µKFi > q∗]
+ 1Pr (Ai)
pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗)E [qi | µUAi > q∗]
+ 1Pr (Ai)
pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗)E [qi | µUFi > q∗]
= µ+ σKPr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ σUPr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
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